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Abstract 
The paper deals with hybrid systems, where human actors and non-human agents 
meet and interact. Different from most of the literature on autonomous technol-
ogy, which mainly deals with the question of agency of non-humans, the paper 
puts forward the assumption that the release of smart technology may lead to a 
deconstruction of order or even a regime change, thus raising the question of how 
order emerges in hybrid systems. Discussing different sociological concepts, the 
paper identifies two modes of governance: central control and decentralized self-
organization. However, smart technology allows implementing different system's 
architectures, some of which may go beyond this traditional distinction. Referring 
to a case study on collision avoidance in aviation (and especially the mid-air colli-
sion at Ueberlingen in 2002), the paper shows that hybrid systems create new op-
portunities, but entail new risks as well. The release of smart technology seems to 
intensify well-known problems of automation, especially when systems get out of 
control. Aviation is one of the societal fields, where experiments with new modes 
of governance currently take place that combine features of central control and 
decentralized self-organization. 
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1 Introduction: The problem of 
(social) order 
Modern knowledge societies find 
themselves in a situation that may turn 
out as the threshold of a new era, 
which is constituted by a new relation-
ship of man and machine, of technol-
ogy and society. Smart agents are now 
being released in large numbers into 
the real world, which are stupid com-
pared to human beings, but can gener-
ate "intelligent" behaviour if they are 
interconnected to large networks. 
Smart technical agents meet human 
actors more and more frequently, and 
they interact and coordinate their ac-
tions. Artificial societies emerge and 
mingle with human societies. Hybrid 
systems come into being which are 
constituted of human and non-human 
decision makers. 
Sociology has reacted to this phe-
nomenon in different ways: Bruno La-
tour and others raised the question of 
agency of non-humans and proposed a 
symmetric ontology (cf. Latour 1998). 
However, the primary focus of Latour 
has always been the claim that non-
humans have to be accepted as equal 
ranked co-players, disregarding the 
question of the specific features of the 
interaction of humans and (smart, 
autonomous) non-humans in distrib-
uted systems – and whether it differs 
from other types of interaction. Other 
researchers in the fields of "artificial 
societies" (cf. Epstein/Axtell 1996, Macy 
1998) and "socionics" (cf. Malsch 1997, 
Kron 2002) have tried to utilize their 
knowledge of human societies and to 
transfer it analogously to artificial so-
cieties in order to create more realistic 
designs of multi-agent systems that – 
conversely – help to better understand 
how social order emerges out of the 
interaction of utility maximizing a-
gents. Despite of many insights about 
the functioning and especially the dy-
namics of distributed systems, the ob-
vious shortcoming of this kind of re-
search has been that it is not suited to 
explore the interaction of real humans 
and artificial agents. 
Thus the question remains unresolved, 
how orderly structures emerge in hy-
brid systems, which consist of human 
actors and non-human agents. Refer-
ring to human societies, the term "so-
cial order" typically implies 
• the existence of various self-
interested actors (thus establishing 
the need to regulate the processes 
of interaction and exchange by 
some kind of rule-set), 
• a mechanism of the generation of 
mutual expectations and trust as a 
base of cooperation, and finally 
• the sedimentation of proven pat-
terns of interaction in the form of 
stable societal institutions which 
serve as constraints and generate a 
kind of momentum as well (cf. 
Esser 1993, Weyer 1993a, Schimank 
2005). 
If we refer to hybrid systems, many 
questions still are unresolved, e.g. 
• how interaction works, if actors 
and agents are involved (and, be-
sides, if we are allowed to apply the 
term "interaction" to these proc-
esses at all), 
• how a certainty of expectation can 
be achieved, which is – referring to 
Uwe Schimank (1992) – an inevita-
ble prerequisite for strategic action 
in modern societies, and finally 
• how rules, norms and even institu-
tions emerge in hybrid systems, 
that guarantee a certain amount of 
integration and stability and make 
possible the governance of this new 
type of systems – in a way that 
avoids risks and allows for a safe 
conduct of operations. 
Referring mainly to the third item, the 
following paper will show that smart 
technology allows for creating hybrid 
systems, which offer the opportunity of 
a regime change (in aviation and in 
other large technical systems as well) 
by deconstructing the old order and 
establishing a new order that entails a 
new mode of governance. Additionally, 
hybrid systems seem to open up differ-
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ent options to go beyond the tradi-
tional distinction of the two well-
known governance modes: central 
control and decentralized self-organi-
zation. Hybrid systems create new op-
portunities, but entail new risks as 
well. Aviation is one of the societal 
fields, where experiments with new 
modes of governance currently take 
place. 
1.1 Preview of chapters 
Chapter 2 of the paper sketches the 
research on smart technology and hy-
brid systems and tries to identify dif-
ferent arguments in the analysis of the 
interaction of man and smart ma-
chines. One thesis that can frequently 
be found in literature is the assertion 
that the introduction of smart technol-
ogy increases uncertainty and risk, 
leading to a deconstruction of tradi-
tional patterns of social order (chapter 
2.1). These tendencies mostly are re-
lated to a new type of distributed sys-
tems, which are able to generate prac-
tical solutions by means of self-organi-
zation in decentralized networks, thus 
establishing a new kind of autono-
mous technology (chapter 2.2). This 
issue has been integrated into a socio-
logical theory of distributed agency by 
Werner Rammert and Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer (chapter 2.3). However, they 
did not deal with the creation of order 
which is at the centre of this paper. In 
the work of Gene Rochlin some hints 
can be found concerning the manage-
ment of complex systems, leading to a 
classification of types of order. Thus 
the question can be raised, whether 
smart technology facilitates the con-
struction of new modes of governance 
of complex systems, which go beyond 
the traditional distinction of central-
ized control and decentralized self-
organization (chapter 2.4). 
Referring to this state of the art of re-
search on smart technology chapter 3 
presents a case study on the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) – one of the first cases of a hy-
brid system that failed and contributed 
to a catastrophe in aviation in 2002. 
The invention and introduction of 
TCAS can be regarded as the transfor-
mation of the traditional, hierarchical 
system of air traffic control (ATC) and 
the creation of a new type of order in 
aviation. The paper presents insights 
into the operational logic of TCAS 
(chapter 3.1), especially into the inter-
play of human actors and non-human 
agents (chapter 3.2) and then analyses 
in a Perrow-like style the causes of the 
mid-air collision near Ueberlingen in 
2002 (chapter 3.3). 
Chapter 4 first asks, if the debate on 
"pervasive computing" may serve as a 
framework even for the analysis of 
TCAS (4.1), and then tries to answer 
the question of whether modern avia-
tion can be regarded as a hybrid sys-
tem of distributed agency (4.2). It then 
summarizes the argument of the 
change from the old regime of central-
ized control to the new regime of de-
centralized self-organization more 
systematically (4.3). Chapter 4.4 finally 
outlines the perspectives of future 
aviation that go beyond this distinc-
tion, leading to a short conclusion 
(chapter 5). 
 
2 Smart technology and hybrid 
systems 
2.1 Pervasive computing 
In aviation, in road traffic as well as in 
many other sectors of society we can 
presently observe a new type of tech-
nology emerging which differs to some 
respect from the (automation) tech-
nology of past decades. It has been 
labelled "pervasive" or "ubiquitous 
computing". The visions of the engi-
neers suggest that in future a large 
number of smart, embedded agents 
will monitor and control our actions 
and help us to manage our everyday 
life ("smart washing machine") or dan-
gerous situations e.g. in traffic ("smart 
assistant systems"). These agents may 
become more and more autonomous, 
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thus displacing the human decision 
maker. 
Referring to Marc Weiser, who first 
outlined the vision of ubiquitous com-
puting in 1991, Friedemann Mattern 
(2003) describes the vision of a world, 
which is inhabited by miniaturized, 
sensor-equipped devices that have the 
capability of context-awareness, i.e. 
they can observe their environment 
and can react to a change of certain 
parameters (such as light, tempera-
ture, speed, distance etc.). These smart 
devices are part of almost any object 
(desk, window, door, coffee machine 
etc.) and can communicate the col-
lected data with other parts of the sys-
tem (cf. TA-Swiss 2003b). 
According to Mattern and others, a 
large number of pervasive smart ob-
jects will observe the movements and 
actions of all people involved and 
check them according to predefined 
patterns.1 These smart devices are om-
nipresent, but they are disappearing at 
the same time – they become invisible 
to the user (cf. Weiser 1991). In future 
no human being will be forced to op-
erate a computer interface any more 
(like a computer keyboard, a touch pad 
or any adjusting lever e.g. for the cen-
tral heating), because all the smart 
objects around observe their environ-
ment and act according to pre-pro-
grammed routines, e.g. switching on 
the light when you enter the room. 
However, many proponents of smart 
technology also have identified con-
siderable risks, since smart objects 
allow for an identification and localisa-
tion of mobile objects and people, thus 
raising questions about data protec-
tion as well as about abuse of these 
systems for surveillance by totalitarian 
organizations (Mattern 2003: 14). This 
conflict seems to be irresolvable, be-
                                                       
1 The basic underlying technology is Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), i.e. the 
equipment of people and objects with 
transponders that submit all relevant data 
needed to identify and to track a person; cf. 
Locquenghien 2006. 
cause if you strengthen data protection 
by inhibiting the hidden exchange of 
data, the performance and the effi-
ciency of the systems will diminish and 
vice versa. 
Mattern points at a large number of 
unresolved questions, which – accord-
ing to his opinion – have to be solved 
urgently, if modern societies want to 
exploit the potentials of the new tech-
nology. One cause of concern is the 
possible loss of control, if smart ob-
jects become disloyal. Another ques-
tion is the degree of autonomy of 
smart objects. A further serious prob-
lem is the erosion of trust, which 
emerges for example by dynamic pric-
ing in the internet or by the dynamic 
adjustment of the (mostly) virtual envi-
ronment (cf. Skiera 2000, Mattern 
2003, TA-Swiss 2003b).2 Trust is a cen-
tral feature of modern societies, be-
cause – as Uwe Schimank argues 
(1992) – strategic actors can only exe-
cute goal-oriented action if there is at 
least some sort of certainty of expecta-
tion, i.e. a (mutual) expectation that 
other actors will behave in a predict-
able way that has emerged as a result 
of previous actions and interactions. 
Furthermore said certainty of expecta-
tion allows for individual and organ-
izational learning and thus is – in addi-
tion with goal-oriented action – one 
major precondition for societal devel-
opment. In a world without trust social 
relations will erode and societal devel-
opment will slow down or even grind 
to a halt. 
In a world of smart, adaptive things 
the objects are no longer stable and 
resistant, but soft and fleeting (cf. 
Hubig 2003). This may result in a 
number of severe consequences for 
                                                       
2 Mattern (2003) and others such as Lang-
heinrich (2003) discuss the option of a 
virtual memory which helps finding a path 
through the real world by providing infor-
mation about the objects. If each object 
has its own website, the "identity" of the 
objects as well as the – virtual – reality we 
are living in, may change frequently and 
may be manipulated easily. 
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human action, because individual (as 
well as societal) learning is only possi-
ble, if you can fail when acting strate-
gically. According to Hubig, in a smart 
world that constantly changes people 
are hindered to act strategically, be-
cause strategic action implies to take 
into consideration the boundary con-
ditions of action (the world outside as 
well as the presumptive actions of 
other actors), to calculate the probabil-
ity of success and failure, and subse-
quently, to adjust the strategy accord-
ing to the result of the action. 
Hubig and other critics of pervasive 
computing thus emphasize the decon-
struction of the traditional order of 
social life, which has been triggered by 
the introduction of smart technology. 
Intelligent systems, as described 
above, prevent human actors from 
acting strategically and from learning 
that way because they try to avoid 
situations in which the individual can 
fail (and learn) – by presenting or 
rather constructing a "perfect" world 
that shows up according to the sys-
tem's rules, the user does neither 
know nor understand. 
2.2 Distributed systems 
In order to grasp the capacity of smart 
systems it is necessary to understand 
the sources of their performance, 
which differ significantly from previous 
systems e.g. in automation technology 
insofar as agency is constituted by the 
cooperation of distributed compo-
nents. 
Smart systems typically consist of net-
works of embedded computers, which 
are equipped with sensors and com-
munication devices in order to collect 
data and communicate them to other 
components of the system (cf. Mattern 
2003). The singular components of 
these systems are not intelligent, at 
least when regarded from the point of 
view of traditional artificial intelligence 
(AI) research. They are rather stupid 
because of lacking computer power as 
well as missing capabilities to over-
view the whole situation. The single 
device doesn't have global information, 
but the network of "smart" object may 
develop a remarkable problem-solving 
capability. 
In the last decades the traditional no-
tion of intelligence which mainly fo-
cuses on the cognitive capacities and 
human-like properties of a machine 
has been replaced by a new concept of 
intelligence which focuses on the 
problem-solving capacities of com-
puter systems or rather multi-agent 
systems ("practical intelligence"). This 
paradigm shift has among others been 
promoted by Rodney Brooks. In his 
book "Flesh and Machines" (2002) he 
describes his unsuccessful attempts to 
program a robot that could manoeuvre 
safely through a building, avoiding 
collisions with people and objects. All 
attempts to take into consideration, 
according to the model of anticipative 
planning, every possible situation and 
to supply the machine with a software-
based routine to cope with these situa-
tions, failed as Brooks shows in his 
description. It is the simple changes of 
light and shadow during the course of 
the day that raise unsolvable problems 
to a robot of this type (Brooks 2002: 
39pp., 52). Every conceivable constel-
lation had to be put down in the mem-
ory of the central processor, and it 
would take several minutes to calcu-
late one single step of the robot. In 
fact this device would be incapable of 
solving very simple tasks. 
Therefore 20 years ago the idea came 
up to do without a central processor, 
to distribute "intelligence" among the 
different parts ("agents") of a machine 
and to combine these parts into a 
multi-agent system (MAS). The singu-
lar agents only have little computer 
power, but they can act autonomously 
according to their simple internal 
rules, and – the most innovative fea-
ture – they can monitor their environ-
ment and thus contribute to a behav-
iour of the entire system that can be 
described as adaptive. A MAS robot 
can very easily move through a build-
ing only complying with simple rules 
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of movement and collision avoidance. 
It is rather the coupling of a number of 
simple, decentralized agents and not 
the superior "intelligence" of a central-
ized brain that makes these systems so 
powerful. "Intelligence" thus appears 
as an emergent feature of the network 
(and its coordinating activities) and 
not as a given property of the elements 
(also cf. Weiser 1991: 72). MAS systems 
can act in real time and they can adapt 
to their environment. Brooks created 
small insect-like machines which 
moved around with an astonishing 
agility and thus contributed to the 
emergence of the new research field of 
"Artifical life", because the behaviour of 
the machines resembled living organ-
isms. Above all: The performance of 
MAS was much better than the per-
formance of classical robots con-
structed by referring to the traditional, 
"cognitive" AI paradigm (also cf. 
Christaller 2001). 
Since then the idea has gained ground 
in different sectors of society (e.g. 
transportation or aviation) that decen-
tralized systems of distributed agents 
can perform better and help to avoid 
risks (cf. chapter 3). 
2.3 The question of agency 
Promoted by Brooks and others, dur-
ing the last 20 years a new generation 
of technology has emerged, which can 
be categorized – according to Werner 
Rammert and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer 
(2002) – as interactive, intelligent and 
adaptive. This results in implications 
for the interaction of man and ma-
chine, since the traditional instrumen-
tal notion of technology no longer 
applies, if technological devices gain 
the capability of autonomous decision 
making. Thus, from a sociological 
point of view the question of agency of 
objects arises. 
Rammert and Schulz-Schaeffer have 
made an attempt to answer this ques-
tion in a way that goes beyond the 
symmetrical ontology of Bruno Latour 
(1996, 1998). They raise the question 
of how technology studies shall deal 
with technical objects, which behave 
and interact in a way that resembles 
social interaction (Rammert/Schulz-
Schaeffer 2002: 16).3 
There are more and more technical 
systems where intelligent agents assist 
or substitute the human decision 
maker (e.g. in modern airplanes, trains 
or cars, cf. Timpe 2002). The behaviour 
of a car which brakes automatically in 
case of danger looks very similar to the 
behaviour of a car where the action 
has been taken by a human controller. 
In many instances we are unable (from 
an outside point of view) to distinguish 
human action from non-human action, 
because the system's behaviour is al-
most identical. It can only be said, the 
socio-technical system, consisting of 
the driver, the brake assistant and 
other devices, has performed in a way 
that usually is described as an action, 
which is based on a decision. Thus, 
people attribute a more or less strate-
gic behaviour even to non-human 
agents and technical objects, if they 
behave in a way that resembles human 
action (cf. Brooks 2002: 56). 
Rammert's and Schulz-Schaeffer's con-
struct a model of "distributed agency 
between people and objects" (2002: 
21), which distinguishes different lev-
els of "agency" that can be achieved 
either by human actors or by technical 
agents (43-50): 
• causality: the ability to trigger 
changes, 
• contingency: the capability to act 
in a different way (i.e. choosing al-
ternatives), 
• intentionality: the ability to control 
and to give meaning to the given 
behaviour. 
At the first level there are almost no 
differences between men and ma-
                                                       
3 Bruno Latour never dealt with smart ob-
jects, but with representatives of a tech-
nology that can also be understood by 
using the traditional instrumental notion of 
technology, such as key tags or speed 
bumps; cf. Rammert 2003. 
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chines. A dish washer can do its job at 
least as good as the well-behaved hus-
band. However, to meet the decision 
which kind of dishes may be put into 
the dish washer (second level), re-
quires some sort of advanced technol-
ogy which can for example distinguish 
different material. Bid assistants at 
electronic market places or autopilots 
in modern planes obviously can be 
subsumed to this category. 
The third level is the most complicated 
one. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer avoid 
a final statement (e.g. on ontological 
issues) and call for an observation of 
the societal practices of attribution of 
intentionality to either people or ob-
jects instead (47). They argue that in-
tentionality is not a natural ingredient 
of human action, but mostly a product 
of processes of interpretation and at-
tribution. Human beings are used to 
suppose that someone who acts in the 
way he acts, has done so because he 
intended to do so. But nobody really 
knows, if this assumption of rational 
decision making is true. The same 
could even apply to machines. Today 
we still are not used to assume that a 
brake assistant acts intentionally, but – 
according to Rammert/Schulz-Schaef-
fer – this is a societal practise we 
should reflect about and not a fixed 
ontological fact. 
Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer have 
sketched a new framework that helps 
to better understand the roles, actors 
and agents can play in hybrid systems. 
However, some questions remain. First 
they do not deal with the interaction of 
actors and agents as well as the emer-
gence of social order out of this inter-
action. Their model just integrates 
non-humans into a framework of 
agency, which obviously is guided by 
the concept of equality in character of 
human actors and non-human agents. 
This implies that sociology can con-
struct agent societies according to the 
rules of human societies, taking a 
similarity of actors and agents for 
granted. 
Second – as a kind of consequence of 
the first issue – from their point of 
view the interaction of a human with 
other humans cannot systematically be 
differentiated from the interaction of a 
human with non-humans.4 Rammert/ 
Schulz-Schaeffer thus cannot put for-
ward the question, if different types of 
systems and even new types of social 
order emerge from these different 
kinds of interaction. They confine 
themselves to the micro-level of 
agency, which is important without 
doubt. However, since they do not 
treat the problem of social order, they 
also do not deal with the question, if 
these new types of hybrid systems are 
feasible or even desirable. 
Finally Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer do 
not care about the consequences or 
risks of hybrid systems and their diffu-
sion in society. Instead, they call for a 
new approach, which explores the 
broad variety of distributed agency 
open-mindedly. Their model thus can 
be regarded as a neutral point of view 
which does not care about possible 
societal risks of hybrid systems, as put 
forward by the authors quoted in 
chapter 2.1. 
2.4 A new mode of governance? 
A more sceptical, pessimistic view is 
taken by Gene Rochlin, who summa-
rizes the experiences already made by 
implementing agent systems in differ-
ent sectors of society. In his book 
"Trapped in the Net" (1998) Rochlin 
discusses the "unanticipated conse-
quences of computerization" (subtitle 
of the book), which is – to start with 
the conclusion – a fundamental trans-
formation of society. His argumenta-
                                                       
4 The still open question, if one should 
apply the terms "interaction" or "coopera-
tion" even to machines, can be answered 
here, referring to Rammert (2003: 297), as 
follows: if technology can change its be-
haviour according to the given situation – 
which is level two of the scheme presented 
above – then it might appropriate to use 
this term. This concept differs deeply from 
Latour, who attributes agency to every kind 
of (technical or natural) object. 
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tion is based on a number of case 
studies on the informating of labour, 
the management of organizations, 
computer trading, the automatisation 
of high reliability systems and, finally, 
on different instances of the imple-
mentation of smart technology in the 
field of the military. His main argu-
ment is that in history we can observe 
a sequence of modes of management 
of organizations as follows (7p.): 
• Hierarchical, centralized control 
and rational planning (core tech-
nology: mainframe computers, pe-
riod of time: 1950s and 1960s), 
• flexible, decentralized self-organi-
zation (core technology: personal 
computer, period of time: 1970s 
and 1980s), 
• central control of decentralized 
structures by means of networking 
(core technology: networking of 
heterogeneous, distributed sys-
tems, e.g. via the internet, period of 
time: since the 1990s).5 
Rochlin's book deals with the apparent 
paradox that in the third mode (mode 
C) the networking of autonomous ele-
ments eventually ends up with a total 
control and loss of autonomy. Road 
traffic is a good example to illustrate 
this recent paradigm shift (cf. Spehr 
2006): in a first step the singular cars 
could improve their performance by 
adding electronic assistants such as 
the navigation system, which largely 
increased the autonomy of the drivers, 
e.g. in finding an alternative route in 
case of congestion (mode B). As soon 
as cars become "knots in the net" (TA-
Swiss 2003a: 2) which communicate 
all relevant data bidirectional, a re-
centralization and a redistribution of 
authority takes place (mode C), which 
in principal gives way even to visionary 
concepts of the remote control of road 
traffic, e.g. in order to avoid negative 
effects such as congestions (cf. TA-
                                                       
5 In the following the paper will refer to 
these three stages as "mode A", "mode B" 
and "mode C" (cf. chart 3 on page 144). 
Swiss 2003a, Weyer 2006a). This would 
imply far-reaching interventions from 
outside and an almost total loss of 
control on the side of the drivers. 
Referring to this partly foreseeable, 
partly even realized change of the sys-
tem's architecture and its control logic, 
Rochlin uses the term "computer trap" 
(217) to point at the unintended and 
unpredicted consequences of the im-
plementation of smart technical de-
vices. His main concerns are the fore-
seeable risks of this development such 
as the deconstruction of social institu-
tions (56, 208p.) and the growing vul-
nerability and dependency of society 
on a kind of technology which can 
hardly be controlled, but entails un-
predictable risks (11, 14, 106, 186). 
One would obviously misinterpret 
Rochlin, if one relates these negative 
impacts to the character of the tech-
nology and nothing else. Rochlin in-
sists that it is the striving for a perma-
nent improvement of efficiency (and 
the utilization of computer networks to 
achieve this objective) which causes a 
development that eventually ends up 
with a standardization of processes 
and a subordination of decentralized 
systems under a central plan (as e.g. in 
the case of inventory or data ware-
house systems). The technological 
foundation of this type of systems, 
which operates in a mode of central, 
anticipative control, is the electronic 
networking and integration of num-
bers of elements in real time (mode C). 
Rochlin uses the term "micro-manage-
ment" (149, cf. 63), to indicate a strat-
egy of vertical coordination, which 
intervenes directly at any level by 
means of advanced IT devices, thus 
governing every process in the whole 
organization. Rochlin also hints at the 
risks of such a development, which are 
a loss of autonomy and "slack" (63, 
213) – i.e. the ability to react to unex-
pected situations flexibly – as well as 
"the potential losses of social means 
for learning, social capacity for adapta-
tion, and social space for innovation 
and creativity" (213). 
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Rochlin apparently is a promoter of 
decentralized self-coordination (mode 
B). He argues that systems of this type 
are able to cope with unexpected 
situations, because the members of the 
organization are well-trained in crisis 
management (cf. Rochlin 1991, La-
Porte/Consolini 1991, Krücken/Weyer 
1999). Every measure that transfers the 
decision-making authority to a central 
control body therefore entails the risk 
of a fatal error, because the design of a 
centralized system may entail errors, 
which finally inhibit the participants to 
act according to the concrete opera-
tional needs in a given emergency 
situation. 
To summarize Rochlin's argument: The 
new type of smart technology facili-
tates the emergence of a new mode of 
governance of complex systems, which 
goes beyond the well-known types of 
central control and decentralised self-
coordination. "Intelligent" systems give 
rise to the capability to execute some 
kind of central control of decentralised 
systems (mode C), since smart devices 
can collect large amount of data about 
the world and the people and integrate 
them – by networking – into a unique 
control architecture. 
2.5 Summary 
If we compare the concept of Ram-
mert/Schulz-Schaffer with the ap-
proach of Rochlin, the divergences are 
obvious. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
have constructed a model for an unbi-
ased analysis of hybrid systems (with 
distributed agency) which still lacks 
empirical evidence and is open-minded 
concerning the results of future devel-
opment. Rochlin, on the other hand, 
does not take much care of theoretical 
questions of agency, but has analysed 
a number of cases of the informating 
of society which give evidence to the 
assumption that networks of pervasive 
smart devices may lead to totalitarian 
systems of central control which even-
tually end up with a fundamental 
transformation of society. 
Up to now the debate has been unre-
solved and the two approaches have 
not yet been conciliated. But we can 
take this controversy as a starting 
point for the analysis of the case study 
on TCAS (cf. chapter 3). This case shall 
help to discuss the issue of distributed 
agency on the one hand and the topic 
of governance of hybrid systems on 
the other. It will show that the tradi-
tional, hierarchical order of aviation 
(mode A) has been deconstructed by 
the implementation of innovative tech-
nological systems, leading to a reor-
ganization of air traffic control and an 
introduction of another mode of gov-
ernance (mode B), which, however, 
entails some previously unknown 
risks. Therefore the question will be 
discussed, if the new regime of decen-
tralized self-organization in aviation, 
which is facilitated by TCAS, can guar-
antee the same level of safety as the 
old hierarchical system of centralized 
control. The following chapter 4 will 
take a look at future developments 
beyond TCAS that may lead to new 
combinations of governance modes 
(mode C). 
 
3 Case Study TCAS 
In the following section a case study 
on the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) will be pre-
sented, which explores the operational 
logic of a hybrid system, discusses the 
challenges and risks and raises some – 
tentative – questions about different 
control logics and system architec-
tures. The experiences, which have 
been gathered with the interaction of 
human actors and non-human agents 
in TCAS guided aircraft during the last 
ten years, are being interpreted in the 
following as a part of the effort to cre-
ate a new type of socio-technical order 
in hybrid systems. 
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3.1 History and operational logic of 
TCAS 
TCAS is an airborne short-range colli-
sion avoidance system which is man-
datory equipment of modern passen-
ger aircraft in the U.S. since 1994 and 
in the European Union since 2000 
(Denke 2001, Nordwall 2002). Its pur-
pose is to prevent aircraft from midair 
collision by warning the pilot when 
another plane is in a predefined range 
of about six kilometres (which is about 
40 seconds flight time, cf. chart 1). 
This is especially important at night or 
when weather conditions are bad.6 
If a TCAS system detects a conflict 
situation it warns the pilot ("traffic 
advisory") and some seconds later is-
sues commands to climb or to descend 
("resolution advisory"). If both aircraft 
which are part of the conflict are 
equipped with TCAS "they will commu-
nicate to avoid mirror-image manoeu-
vres" (Nordwall 2002). 
TCAS thus can be regarded as a dis-
tributed system where two (or even 
three) agents "communicate inten-
tions" (Nordwall 2002) and coordinate 
their actions autonomously. Even if 
                                                       
6 For more details see VC 1997, BFU 2004. 
the pilot finally takes the action, the 
proposal to act is generated by a set of 
communicating agents. TCAS is a 
"foolproof" system, and pilots "have a 
high regard" (Nordwall 2002) for this 
device (cf. also VC 1997). Nevertheless 
TCAS has been one cause among oth-
ers in the midair collision of a Russian 
Tupolew Tu154M and a DHL cargo 
Boeing B757-200 on July 1, 2002 over 
the Bodensee in southern Germany, 
killing all 71 passengers aboard. Both 
aircraft had been equipped with the 
latest version of TCAS.7 
Before describing the chain of events 
that led to the disaster, it is necessary 
to understand the role TCAS plays in 
the overall system of aviation safety. 
3.2 ATC or TCAS? 
The well established system whose 
task is to avoid accidents in aviation is 
the ground based air traffic control 
(ATC). ATC centres are equipped with 
modern devices – mostly redundant – 
to detect airplanes far away. They have 
                                                       
7 The recent midair collision in Brazil on 
September 29, 2006 might also partly be 
caused by a malfunctioning TCAS or a gap 
in the system which arises from the invisi-
bility of a plane that has switched off its 
transponder; cf. Fiorino 2006. 
 
Chart 1: TCAS – Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(souce: Mensen 2004: 374) 
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global information of schedules and 
current traffic on different flight levels. 
Moreover they can communicate with 
the airplanes by radio telephony but 
also by asking the transponders of the 
planes to communicate all relevant 
data. So in an ideal situation the ATC 
has complete information. The ATC 
system is a typical example of a hierar-
chical, centrally controlled system 
which in principle is able – referring to 
Perrow (1984) – to guarantee a high 
degree of safety. 
However, since the 1960s an alterna-
tive safety system has been developed 
which functions according to a very 
different logic, which is decentralized 
coordination. TCAS creates a commu-
nication link between two (or more) 
aircraft and so can avoid collisions 
independently of the ATC ground con-
trol. It is obvious that this system can 
only work reliable, if every aircraft is 
being equipped with (at least similar) 
TCAS devices. And it generates ques-
tions about the co-ordination of ATC 
and TCAS which can be answered in 
different ways – either replacing the 
ground control by an independent sys-
tem or finding reliable ways of coop-
eration of the two systems. One cause 
of the Ueberlingen accident is the fact 
that different aviation communities 
had generated different answers to this 
question. 
The U.S. Standard Operation Proce-
dures (SOPs) 
In the U.S. as well as in Europe TCAS is 
being regarded as an additional short-
range "safety net" (VC 1997) that only 
issues warnings if the ATC systems 
already has failed (Nordwall 2002). 
Pilots are being trained to rely on TCAS 
and to obey its commands strictly in a 
case of emergency – especially con-
cerning the fact that in these situations 
there remain only a very few seconds 
to react properly. U.S. pilots are used 
to ignore the commands of ground 
controllers, because they are aware of 
the fact that in such a critical situation 
the ATC has imperfect knowledge, 
since the (decentralised) TCAS systems 
are not designed to communicate their 
data to the ATC computer. 
U.S. pilots rely on TCAS even if they 
know that this system has some short-
comings. In the U.S. TCAS had only 
been mandatory for passenger aircraft 
with more than 30 seats, whereas the 
European Union had put the limit to a 
weight of 15 metric tons.8 Every pilot 
flying a TCAS-equipped aircraft there-
fore must be aware of the fact that 
there may be some other aircraft, e.g. 
military or small planes, in the vicinity 
which are invisible to him (VC 1997). 
The Russian Standard Operation Pro-
cedures 
The Russian SOPs concerning TCAS 
are very different, since they distrust 
the system because of its well-known 
limitations and pitfalls. The Russian 
logic to cope with situations of conflict 
between ATC and TCAS was very sim-
ple: "In Russia pilots will take ATC's 
orders over the instructions of any 
onboard navigational system." (Venik 
2002, emphasis added) Besides the 
invisibility of some sort of aircraft the 
reason is, that ATC has "a complete 
picture of the sky" (ibd.) which is based 
on redundant systems (TCAS is not 
redundant). Obviously there is some 
confusion in the skies and a conflict 
between different safety cultures. This 
confusion is partly due to the fact, that 
the two safety systems are not inter-
connected. There is no feedback that 
informs the ground controller of the 
recommendations given by TCAS to the 
pilots. Such a feedback obviously 
would help to improve the system's 
performance and avoid opposing 
commands. In the current state the 
conflict must be resolved by the lonely 
pilot who has to decide – in a very 
short period of time – to ignore one of 
the two safety measures the original 
                                                       
8 These rules have been changed and inter-
nationally harmonized in 2003 (17 metric 
tons) and again in 2005 (5.7 metric tons, cf. 
Mensen 2004: 375). 
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intention of which had been to in-
crease air transportation safety (cf. 
Venik 2002). And he takes the full re-
sponsibility for his actions – a typical 
pitfall of automation which apparently 
cannot substitute for human decision 
making, but creates situations of hu-
man decision making which are much 
more difficult to solve than before. 
However, the confusion is also partly 
due to the incompatible operational 
logics of the two systems: Either you 
rely on central control and put the 
responsibility on the controller, who 
organizes the system's performance by 
hierarchical governance, or you rely on 
the problem-solving capacity of decen-
tralized self-organization and distrib-
ute responsibility within the system. 
But you cannot do both at once. We'll 
come back to this question later. 
Now it is easier to understand the Ue-
berlingen crash, because the crew of 
the DHL cargo Boeing followed the 
U.S. SOPs, to obey strictly TCAS, while 
the crew of the Russian Tupolew was 
divided on the question which proce-
dure to follow and finally adopted the 
Russian way which urged them to rely 
on the ground controller and to ne-
glect the recommendation of the TCAS, 
which unhappily was exactly the oppo-
site. This conflict, however, could have 
been resolved, if there had not been an 
unfortunate concatenation of events 
which contributed to the dramatics of 
the situation. 
3.3 The Mid-Air Collision at Ueber-
lingen 
The two planes crashed at July 1, 2002 
at 23:35:32 at flight level FL 360, which 
is a height of about 11.000 meters. 
Both planes had been guided by the 
ATC at Zurich (Switzerland) where only 
one controller was on active duty. He 
had taken over the two planes only a 
few minutes before, but did only real-
ize the conflict 43 seconds before the 
collision. When he issued his warn-
ings, the TCAS systems of the two air-
craft had already automatically gener-
ated their recommendations (TAs and 
RAs), and the tragedy was that he 
urged the Russian crew to descend – 
which was exactly the contrary of the 
TCAS recommendation (cf. chart 2). 
Additionally an instructor, who was 
not familiar with the TCAS system, had 
taken over the role of the pilot in 
command (PIC) in the Russian plane, 
while the other pilot – in normal situa-
tions the commander – acted as the 
pilot flying (PF). After the contrary rec-
ommendations had been issued the 
crew was not only confused about the 
facts but also had to cope with author-
 Chart 2: The Mid-Air Collision at Ueberlingen 
 (source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 20.07.2002: 7) 
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ity and coordination problems, since 
the PIC demanded to comply with the 
commands issued by the ATC, while 
the PF insisted on relying on TCAS. The 
rearrangement of the crew (at a night 
flight!) and the missing comprehension 
of the TCAS system on part of the in-
structor were major causes of the sub-
sequent mistake. So the question 
arises: Was it simply a human error? 
Similar to other cases of highly auto-
mated systems, modern aircraft are 
also conducted by people, the main 
task of which is to monitor the sys-
tem's operating in the routine mode, 
were nothing happens for hours and 
hours. Additionally modern techno-
logical systems are designed to prevent 
the emergency case, which mostly 
works very well – but with the conse-
quence that unforeseen situations oc-
cur only very rarely and can hardly be 
trained systematically. As in other 
cases, the investigation of the Ueber-
lingen crash revealed that the operat-
ing procedures for TCAS, issued by the 
International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), were confusing and incon-
sistent (BFU 2004: 4, 7). At least the 
Russian crew was not familiar with the 
system and had only little experience 
with it. 
However, if we take a look at the or-
ganization of Skyguide, the operator of 
the ATC Zurich, and the safety culture 
of this organization we will find some 
more factors which contributed to the 
disaster: 
In that night there had been mainte-
nance works at the ATC, which re-
quired to partially shut down the radar 
system. As a consequence the Short 
Term Conflict Alert (STCA) system – a 
ground based pendant to TCAS – 
which warns the controller of an up-
coming conflict constellation, was only 
partly operating, i.e. it could not pre-
sent the information optically on the 
screen. However, the controller was 
not aware of this. Generally, no one at 
Skyguide knew exactly which effects 
the maintenance works had on the 
overall performance of the ATC Zurich. 
For example the telephone line was 
out of duty for a few minutes. Evi-
dently there was no awareness that 
this constellation with a coincide of 
uncommon events raises the risk and 
the probability of errors. One possible 
consequence might have been that the 
informal practise of a one-man-opera-
tion had been abandoned that night. 
During the critical period of time (from 
23:30 to 23:35) the attention of the 
unfortunate controller, who later was 
murdered by a relative of one Russian 
victim, was distracted by a third air-
craft, approaching the nearby airport 
of Friedrichshafen, he had to guide, 
too, working at two desks simultane-
ously at different radio frequencies. A 
colleague at Karlsruhe airport who 
also observed the scene and had been 
alerted by his STCA, could not reach 
him by phone because the lines were 
out of duty exactly at that moment. 
(Remember: The STCA at Zurich airport 
could not issue an optical warning at 
that time.) Therefore the controller at 
Zurich only realized the conflict be-
tween the Boeing and the Tupolew a 
few seconds before the crash. He had 
to switch abruptly from the routine to 
the emergency mode (cf. LaPorte/Con-
solini 1991), but it was too late to find 
a proper solution because of the paral-
lel working – above described – of two 
badly coordinated control systems 
working with opposite operation lo-
gics. He suddenly was heavily under 
pressure and made a number of mis-
takes: He didn't understand a radio 
message of the Boeing crew properly 
(partly because of several simultane-
ous messages at the two desks), and 
he didn't register the acoustic STCA 
warning. 
Again: Was it a human error? Or or-
ganizational failure (at Skyguide as 
well as in the cockpit of the Tupolew)? 
Or was it a system's failure – a failure 
of a system that must fail because of 
complexity, of tight coupling, of lax 
safety cultures with a lacking aware-
ness for risky constellations, and fi-
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nally of unavoidable inattentiveness in 
boring night shifts in highly automated 
facilities and systems? 
The following chapter will not deal 
with these questions in detail, because 
they can be treated in the framework 
of the traditional automation debate 
(cf. Weyer 1997). It will instead pitch 
on only one of the multitude of causes 
of the midair collision: the coexistence 
of two contradictory governance 
modes as well as the role of smart 
technology. Thus the question can be 
put forward, which governance mode 
is best suited to manage the risks of 
complex systems. 
 
4 Creating order in hybrid systems 
4.1 Smart systems 
Modern aviation obviously is a good 
example for the omnipresence of em-
bedded, sensor-equipped computers, 
which automatically and increasingly 
autonomously operate in the back-
ground, achieve a remarkable prob-
lem-solving capability by networking 
and generate solutions by the interac-
tion of non-humans. Although it is 
only a quote from literature, the im-
pression that TCAS systems "commu-
nicate intentions" (Nordwall 2002, em-
phasis added) refers to the fact that 
something is happening in aviation 
that comes close to the kind of relation 
we are used to attribute only to hu-
mans up to now. Many of the features 
of "pervasive computing" apply, even if 
the voluminous and costly TCAS sys-
tem cannot be compared with a simple 
RFID chip, and well-trained profes-
sionals as e.g. pilots behave differently 
than non-trained people in everyday 
life. 
However, the TCAS case showed that 
even in a professional environment 
smart technology may lead to some 
confusion and a loss of learning capa-
bility, since new uncertainties arise 
that cannot be solved by learned rou-
tines. Often it is difficult for pilots to 
really understand what happens, and it 
is equally difficult to learn by experi-
ence how TCAS works in an unfore-
seen situation. Steering a modern air-
plane means to totally rely on techni-
cal devices which construct a virtual 
picture of the sky that is hardly distin-
guishable from a computer game as 
e.g. "Flight Simulator" from Microsoft.9 
Aviation has gained a high level of 
safety, but with every innovative tech-
nology new, uncommon risks arise. 
Finally attitudes have changed, since 
pilots' behaviour more and more can 
be described as adaptive rather than 
strategic (cf. Weyer 2006b): even 
though the pilot sees the intruder on 
the screen in advance, he is not forced 
to develop an evasion strategy (if he 
relies on TCAS), but he can calmly wait 
for the advisory automatically gener-
ated by the interacting TCAS systems. 
It is almost impossible to guess in ad-
vance if the recommendation will be 
"climb" or "sink", because this depends 
on a whole string of factors (among 
others the rank of the IDs of the com-
municating TCAS computers) the pilot 
can hardy determine let alone assess. 
The interaction of TCAS and the pilot 
thus resembles more a stimulus-
response-model than the traditional 
concept of strategic (inter-)action. 
As a result the debate on "pervasive 
computing" points out to be a valuable 
context for the analysis of modern 
aviation. 
4.2 The risks of distributed agency 
Aviation can also be regarded as a hy-
brid system of distributed agency. This 
applies to the meso-level of air traffic 
control as well as the micro-level of 
the cockpit. In the latter the (human) 
pilots and a number of (non-human) 
assistance systems such as TCAS work 
together in finding a solution to a 
given situation: TCAS takes the re-
sponsibility for the definition of the 
situation, the interaction with the 
other plane as well as the recommen-
                                                       
9 Personal communication Burkhard Kruse 
(Lufthansa) April 7, 2005. 
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dation of action to the pilot (in a hu-
man-like manner of oral speech), 
whereas the pilot is in charge for car-
rying out of the action and the super-
vising and evaluating the whole system 
(including the meta-decision to rely on 
TCAS). In many regards smart technol-
ogy substitutes human actors and 
"acts" autonomously (e.g. in finding an 
agreement with the other plane – pre-
viously the task of the human control-
ler), but the complete action to evade a 
critical situation is taken by a hybrid 
set of human actors and non-human 
agents, both of whom are responsible 
for different sequences of the action 
chain (cf. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
2002). 
As far as that goes hybrid systems with 
distributed agency are a continuation 
of the well-known path of automation, 
and they share the risks of many other 
highly automated systems. At the same 
time the participation of autonomous 
technology in decision-making proc-
esses contributes to an intensification 
of problems and risks. Operating a 
plane is routine work with boring 
monitoring duties that leads to a low 
level of attention and awareness of 
risks – especially in systems regarded 
as self-controlling and inherently safe. 
In those rare cases of emergency, 
which mostly take the operators by 
surprise, an unexpected interaction of 
system's components produces a 
situation which is only partly under-
stood and which can only hardly be 
managed – especially under time pres-
sure, as the Ueberlingen case showed. 
However, in an emergency situation 
the operators suddenly find them-
selves in a situation where they have 
to take the responsibility to control the 
facility (including a number of smart 
devices). This implies to make very 
difficult decisions, which emerge be-
cause of unfamiliar and previously 
unknown uncertainties. To some re-
gard we can talk of a dramatization of 
the well-known automation paradox: 
the re-entry of the human decision 
maker, which had been excluded from 
making first-order-decisions (steering 
the plane on a climbing or descending 
path) and now has to make second-
order-decisions, i.e. determine if the 
automation device gives the correct 
advice or not and if he can rely on its 
recommendation to climb or to de-
scend. 
Hybrid systems of distributed agency 
tend to intensify the over-reliance on 
technology, which increases risks 
solely by the invisibility of the proc-
esses and the enormous time pressure. 
Additionally hybrid systems, which 
allow for autonomous action of tech-
nology and aim at a "perfect" control of 
the world, run the risk of a loss of 
competence on the part of the opera-
tors, since they try to avoid situations 
in which the operator can gain experi-
ence and learn from experience. Dis-
tributed systems of the given type thus 
have an inherent tendency to turn into 
completely automated systems – with 
the human functioning only as a stop-
gap. 
4.3 A new mode of governance 
Moreover the case study has shown 
that the introduction of TCAS has trig-
gered the deconstruction of the estab-
lished order in aviation, leading to 
some confusion and irritation not only 
about the functioning of the device, 
but also about the rules which hold in 
the system. It is still an ongoing proc-
ess of social learning and experimen-
tation which uncovers the limits and 
pitfalls of the new system architecture. 
As in other cases of the introduction of 
a radically new technology, usually an 
experimentation period of some years 
is needed, until measures will have 
been generated to cope with unfore-
seen situations (cf. Krohn/Weyer 1994, 
Weyer 1997). However this process 
must also include the construction of 
new institutions, i.e. new modes of 
governance of hybrid systems, which 
will probably need a longer period of 
time. 
The implementation of TCAS thus can 
be regarded not only as the introduc-
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tion of a new device, but as a first step 
in a regime change, which may lead to 
a fundamental transformation of avia-
tion, since pilots now are able to re-
solve conflicts in the mode of decen-
tralized self-organization (cf. Deuten 
2003). The next step will be a com-
pletely self-coordination of the aircraft 
during the entire flight ("free-flight"), 
including autonomous routing and 
navigation, which has been developed 
in the U.S. as a successor of TCAS and 
is currently tested in daily flight opera-
tions in Australia (cf. Hughes/Mecham 
2004). 
At the moment pilots find themselves 
in a contradictory situation: their 
autonomy, i.e. their freedom to act 
towards the controller has grown, 
whereas their autonomy to fly the 
plane has diminished because of the 
substitution of many actions by smart 
technology. Despite these uncertain-
ties and only partly determined role 
conflicts, the introduction of TCAS has 
started to establish a new order in 
aviation and a new mode of the gov-
ernance as well (mode B), which co-
exists beside the traditional mode of 
central control (mode A). This may be a 
cause of hardy resolvable conflicts, as 
the Ueberlingen case shows, because 
both modes follow a different opera-
tional logic: 
Centralized control 
In densely coupled traffic systems such 
as aviation or railway transportation 
the safety architecture mostly is based 
on the principle of global optimisation 
(cf. TA-Swiss 2003a). The governance 
structures are shaped by the top objec-
tive of overall system's safety, which is 
– for instance in civil aviation – real-
ized by giving strict orders to the par-
ticipants they have to obey. The con-
trol architecture intends to guarantee 
the system's performance and effi-
ciency (with a load factor as high as 
possible) as well as the safety of op-
erations (with an accident rate as low 
as possible). Social order thus is su-
perimposed in a top-down-manner by 
actors which have superior knowledge 
and are conducted by the goal of 
maintaining public welfare. Technol-
ogy serves as an instrument to monitor 
and to steer the participants of the 
system. 
Decentralized self-organization 
On the contrary the concept of decen-
tralized self-organization argues that 
endogenous processes within a given 
system lead to good and stable solu-
tions, which mostly cannot be attained 
by central control, since the external 
controller doesn't have the knowledge 
that the participants have. Modern 
technology such as TCAS enables the 
user to create solutions for current 
problems (such as optimizing the 
course or avoiding collisions) which 
are doubtlessly superior to the user 
who operates in a conventional man-
ner. The basic logic here is local opti-
misation, since the singular user 
mostly doesn't have global information 
and doesn't take care of the external 
effects of his actions, but optimises his 
performance regardless of the conse-
quences for other users as well as for 
the global system. Social order finally 
emerges in a bottom-up-manner as 
the unintended product of the interac-
tion of selfish actors. So this kind of 
local optimization doesn't need to end 
with a global maximum (cf. Epstein/ 
Axtell 1996: 13). 
However, if safety is at stake, the ar-
gument of the unpredictable emer-
gence of order can also be read from 
the opposite. Emergence also can im-
ply unforeseeable, undesirable behav-
iour, especially in the case of smart 
systems which are designed to act and 
evolve autonomously (cf. Resnick 
1995, Richter/Rost 2004). Air traffic 
controllers for example are reluctant to 
accept the new system architecture, 
because they do not believe that in the 
future system architecture of "free-
flight" a number of ten or more self-
coordinating pilots will be able to gen-
erate solutions with the same level of 
safety as in the traditional system, 
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where one person is in charge of the 
control of the entire system 
(Hughes/Mecham 2004: 50). This may 
indicate that we have only little knowl-
edge what happens if self-organized 
systems get out of control. 
The "double trap" 
In the present transition period be-
tween the old and the new regime, 
where two modes of governance co-
exist, a "double trap" appears: 
• On the one hand self-organizing 
systems are able to create innova-
tive solutions by own means and to 
generate emergent effects – a per-
formance which hardly can be pro-
duced by centralized systems. 
However, these effects are – ac-
cording to the concept of unin-
tended consequences (cf. Vanberg 
1975, Esser 1991) – unpredictable, 
which sometimes might also imply: 
undesirable and uncontrollable. 
Self-organizing systems may get 
out of control – with irreversible 
consequences –, and societies, 
which rely on them, do not have 
measures to recapture them.10 
• On the other hand a central control 
can integrate the system's elements 
and coordinate their behaviour in 
order to avoid or even eliminate 
undesirable or unintended effects 
of self-organization and to achieve 
a global optimum (e.g. safety and 
reliability). However, according to 
Rochlin (1998), this kind of control 
network may be inflexible and even 
endanger the sources of self-
organization and social learning. 
Thus, referring again to Rochlin's idea 
of a third mode, the question arises if 
other options exist which combine the 
advantages of those two modes (and 
help to avoid their shortcomings). 
Smart technology allows for different 
options and different combinations to 
                                                       
10 This may be partly due to the lacking 
theoretical understanding of the mecha-
nisms of self-organization, cf. Greshoff/ 
Schimank 2003, Richter/Rost 2004. 
be explored in future. These options 
will be discussed in the final paragraph 
of this chapter. 
4.4 Paths to future aviation 
The future of aviation – here locked 
upon as a sector, where hybrid sys-
tems advance – can be shaped in dif-
ferent ways, extending or restricting 
the capabilities of human actors and 
non-human agents, thus constructing 
different combinations and constella-
tions of hybrid systems (cf. chart 3). 
Complete decentralization 
One obvious option might be the com-
plete decentralization of aviation, 
based on a high level of electronic 
equipment on board of each plane, 
thus allowing for a decentralized self-
coordination in every phase of the 
flight – as well as a complete dissolu-
tion of ATC. (This is actually the "pur-
est" version of mode B.) When TCAS 
was invented in the 1970s this de-
tachment of the old system had indeed 
been the guiding vision of many engi-
neers (Venik 2002). Experiments with 
"free-flight" now carried out in lowly 
frequented areas in Australia show 
that this might be one path into the 
future of aviation. The single planes 
must be able to locate themselves pre-
cisely (via GPS) and communicate all 
relevant data to the ground station (via 
ADS-B11), but they do so simultane-
ously to other aircraft in a radius of 
250 km, thus allowing for a far-
reaching autonomous coordination 
without intervention of the controller 
(cf. Hughes/Mecham 2004, Hughes 
2005). The first time in the history of 
aviation the pilot has a complete pic-
ture of the sky. The task of ATC thus 
shifts from control to management and 
monitoring, while the pilot receives 
responsibility for navigation, coordina-
tion and separation – similar to the 
situation in the early days of aviation, 
but now on a high level of electronic 
assistance. 
                                                       
11 Automated Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast. 
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Forced automation 
However, a high level of equipment 
with smart devices could also lead to 
the complete displacement of the hu-
man decision maker in the cockpit 
(which stands for a major step towards 
mode C). In the early days of TCAS, the 
intention had been to directly transmit 
its commands to the autopilot, but 
these plans were dropped because of 
technical problems and a still low per-
formance of TCAS (Venik 2002). The 
present solution is a half-hearted 
compromise that leaves room to error, 
as the Ueberlingen case shows. Thus 
the next step could be to establish a 
direct link between TCAS and the 
autopilot in order to automatically 
navigate and avoid collisions without 
human intervention. Even if actually 
nobody in civil aviation puts forward 
this proposal, the unstoppable advance 
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 
military aviation indicates that this 
second path is also on the agenda to-
day (cf. Friese/Hein 2004).12 Experts 
believe that at least in cargo transport 
we will have unmanned planes in 
about ten years, and the cockpit crew 
of passenger planes will be reduced to 
only one pilot, who will work as an 
observer of a completely automated 
system.13 
However this strategy of automation 
totally relies on the autonomous ac-
tion of smart systems as well as their 
capabilities of decentralized coordina-
tion. This is a risk-taking strategy, be-
cause the extension of the area of 
automated decision making only im-
plies that the borderline between hu-
mans and machines is being moved. 
Especially in the case of mode selec-
tion someone has to identify, in which 
                                                       
12 The implementation of unmanned trans-
portation systems e.g. in the field of pas-
senger subways is another indication of 
this trend (cf. Wille 2004). 
13 Personal communication Karsten H. 
Severin (Bundesstelle für Flugunfallunter-
suchung - German Federal Bureau of Air-
craft Accidents Investigation) Oct. 20, 2005. 
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kind of situation (e.g. landing ap-
proach versus cruising) the system is 
currently operating, and take the deci-
sion to select the appropriate control 
mode. In partly automated systems the 
pilot is the decision maker, whereas in 
completely automated systems the 
decisions have been incorporated into 
the system's architecture (e.g. soft-
ware). In this case software engineers 
have to anticipate critical states in 
which the system shifts automatically 
to another mode. However, they are 
unable to check if this solution is ap-
propriate to the given situation, unless 
they learn from experience, namely by 
incidents or accidents.14 Even in com-
pletely automated systems human er-
ror is possible and even unavoidable – 
especially if we take into consideration 
that the decision maker now is a per-
son with no practical experience in 
flying planes (cf. Gras 1994, Weyer 
1997). 
Re-centralization 
To avoid these risks described, the 
strategy of forced automation in many 
cases is accompanied by a closer net-
working of the elements and a subse-
quent recentralization of authority – 
which marks another path to future 
aviation. As Rochlin warningly argues, 
there may be a novel option of the 
central control of decentralized sys-
tems (mode C, cf. chapter 2.4). This 
can be regarded as a combination of 
the two well-known modes of govern-
ance, since it relies on the problem-
solving capabilities of self-organiza-
tion, and simultaneously highly profits 
from the advantages of central control. 
Thus it promises to achieve a combi-
nation of flexibility and efficacy. Para-
doxically autonomous systems, which 
are effectively interconnected via net-
works, would allow for a recentraliza-
tion, i.e. a centralized remote control. 
Referring to the case of German rail-
                                                       
14 This is the reasons why accidents are – 
regarded from a methodological point of 
view – so worthy for application-oriented 
science; cf. Krohn/Weyer 1994. 
ways one could easily image all aircraft 
to be guided by one control centre – 
while the pilot on board would only 
monitor the system and manage those 
emergency cases which cannot be 
handled by the ground control. 
This scenario requires an effective 
means of self-control of the vehicle 
(via smart technology) and of self-
coordination within the system (e.g. 
for the purpose of collision avoidance) 
as well as real-time data communica-
tion with the centre, allowing also for 
effective intervention from outside. In 
this scenario the human operator 
would lose a great deal of his decision 
autonomy, whereas the control centre 
would gain force and the capacity to 
control the entire system. At the same 
time the control architecture described 
here decreases the capability of on-site 
crisis management by the operator, 
whose freedom to act is not only sub-
stituted by smart technical devices but 
also by the new governance mode of 
central control of a decentralized, net-
worked system. 
However, even in this case the problem 
of the effective distribution of authority 
remains unresolved, since two opera-
tional logics still co-exist in a way that 
may lead to confusion in a situation of 
crisis. Moreover, up to now we have 
only little experience with this new 
type of mixed governance. 
Improved coordination 
Therefore another path to a new order 
in aviation might be an improved co-
ordination of the two systems (e.g. ATC 
and TCAS), as repeatedly indicated in 
the case study. Until now both systems 
are only badly interconnected, because 
the recommendations which are gen-
erated by TCAS are not automatically 
communicated to the ground. (Pilots 
and controllers are used to communi-
cate via radio telephony instead, but 
this technology is rather trouble-prone 
and often insufficient in a crisis situa-
tion.) This missing link is due to the 
deliberations about the design of TCAS 
in the 1970s, where aircraft owners 
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were opposed to implement a more 
advanced, but also more costly version 
(cf. Deuten 2003: 233). So a cheaper, 
but also less efficient system came into 
being. Today it is possible to bridge the 
gap between TCAS and ATC with an 
automated data link, which will pro-
vide the control centre with complete 
information about the results of the 
decentralized coordination in the sky 
(thus establishing another variant of 
mode C). However, even if this data 
link will be installed overall in a few 
years, the authority conflict will re-
main, since both modes continue to 
exist side-by-side. So even if the tech-
nical problems will be resolved, the 
question of coordination of the two 
governance modes persists, especially 
the urgent issue, when to obey TCAS 
and when to listen to the ground con-
troller. 
Switch concepts 
One obvious option to cope with the 
problem of mixed governance is to 
create an organization which is able to 
operate in different modes and, addi-
tionally, is capable to switch between 
different modes according to the situa-
tion (again a specimen of mode C). 
This concept can be found in the lit-
erature on "high-reliability organiza-
tions" (HRO, cf. LaPorte/Consolini 
1991) as well as on "group interaction 
in high risk environments" (GIHRE, cf. 
Dietrich/Childress 2004). The central 
idea of both concepts is that organiza-
tions cannot be directed by only one 
mode of governance, since different 
situations (e.g. routine, emergency) 
require different responses. The mes-
sage is: successful organizations, 
which manage complex, highly auto-
mated systems with high risks, can 
guarantee safety, if they develop an 
organizational safety culture that is 
based on the ability to switch between 
different modes – as well as an intense 
and systematic training of all kind of 
situations in order to gain and main-
tain this capability to switch. That way 
HROs can successfully cope even with 
unforeseen crisis. 
As the TCAS case study showed, this 
idea may be a promising tool to ana-
lyse the governance of hybrid systems, 
too; future research will be necessary 
to explore the potential of this ap-
proach more deeply. However, it can 
already be assumed that the appropri-
ate distribution of responsibility and 
action capability between human ac-
tors and non-human agents as well as 
the development of a new institutional 
framework of interaction will be the 
core of an organization's ability to 
manage complex, hybrid systems. In 
the current situation different paths to 
the future of aviation are open. 
 
5 Conclusion 
As the case study on TCAS showed, 
currently a regime change takes place 
in aviation, which can be interpreted 
as the deconstruction of the traditional 
order of central control, triggered by 
the implementation of smart technol-
ogy. The invention of a hybrid system 
gave rise to another mode of govern-
ance (decentralized self-organization – 
mode B), which nowadays co-exists – 
badly connected – with the traditional 
mode A, thus raising the question of 
future options that may combine fea-
tures of the two modes of governance 
(mode C). Currently experiments take 
place in aviation (as well as in other 
traffic systems such as road traffic or 
railway transportation), which aim at 
exploring the practicability of new sys-
tem's architectures with different mix-
tures of humans and non-humans, of 
central control and decentralized self-
organization. It is still an open ques-
tion, which kind of order will succeed, 
but the outline of the different paths to 
future aviation (chapter 4.4) supports 
the assumption that strategies of a 
complete displacement of the human 
decision maker will probably prove to 
be a dead end. Even in future, aviation 
will remain a hybrid system of distrib-
uted agency, where good solutions for 
the management of crisis have to be 
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established in order to achieve a high 
level of safety. 
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